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INTRODUCTION
There may be plenty of fish in the sea, but there are not plenty of wild
fish in the sea anymore.1 Wild fish supply plateaued in the mid-1980s, and
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the American seafood industry now relies on foreign imports to keep up
with the continuous demand for seafood by American consumers.2 By
weight, approximately 90% of the seafood consumed in the United States
(“U.S.”) is imported, and over half is farmed.3 At the same time, roughly
one-third of fish caught in American waters are sold in other countries due
to the high foreign demand for U.S. seafood, a phenomenon experts refer
to as the “Great American Fish Swap.”4 These titanic levels of U.S.
imports have resulted in a seafood trade deficit amounting to upwards of
$16.9 billion.5
In the U.S., most aquaculture—more commonly referred to as fish
farming—takes place in coastal waters and is regulated by state law.6
Regulation of fish farming in federal waters, however, proves much more
difficult.7 The U.S. government’s attempts to tap into the offshore fish
farming industry in domestic waters have been largely unsuccessful.8 As
of 2019, the U.S. ranks 17th in aquaculture production, and marine
aquaculture accounts for a mere 1.5% of the U.S. seafood supply.9

1. See Gunnar Knapp & Michael C. Rubino, The Political Economics of
Marine Aquaculture in the United States, 24 REVS. FISHERIES SCI. &
AQUACULTURE 213, 214 (2016).
2. Id.
3. Understanding Marine Aquaculture, NOAA FISHERIES, https://www
.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/understanding-marine-aquaculture [https://perma.cc/J
345-ZFT7] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
4. David Bianculli, ‘The Great Fish Swap’: How America is Downgrading
its Seafood Supply, NPR (July 17, 2015, 3:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015
/07/17/423490558/the-great-fish-swap-how-america-is-downgrading-its-seafood
-supply [https://perma.cc/DR5V-BFUT].
5. Understanding Marine Aquaculture, supra note 3.
6. See Marine Aquaculture in NOAA Fisheries' Southeast Region, NOAA
FISHERIES, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/southeast/aquaculture/marine-aquacult
ure-noaa-fisheries-southeast-region [https://perma.cc/EZ4J-RZNQ] (last visited
Sept. 3, 2021).
7. See id. (“In the U.S., federal waters begin where state jurisdiction ends
and extends out to 200 nautical miles.”).
8. See, e.g., Gulf Fishermens Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 968
F.3d 456, 456 (5th Cir. 2020).
9. Increase Aquaculture Production, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., https://internalcommerce.data.socrata.com/stories/s/2-1-Increase-Aquaculture-Production/a8ee
-udq3# [https://perma.cc/AN3R-ZQFG] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021); see also
Understanding Marine Aquaculture, supra note 3 (“[T]he United States ranks
17th in total aquaculture production behind China, Indonesia, India, Viet Nam,
Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Egypt, Norway, Chile, Myanmar, Japan,
Thailand, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Brazil, and Ecuador.”).
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Marine aquaculture regulation at the federal level would increase
domestic seafood supply, decrease the massive trade deficit, create jobs in
rural and coastal communities, provide quality assurance to consumers,
and allow wild fishing stock a chance to recover from the effects of
overfishing.10 Marine aquaculture faces opposition from some commercial
fishermen fearing competition and also from environmentalists fearing
pollution, degradation, and harm to the wild fish population.11 However,
many of these concerns stem from the negative impact of antibiotics and
pesticides that resulted from early, outdated attempts at creating marine
aquaculture regimes.12 Today, the rest of the world has shifted toward
sustainable aquaculture practices to balance the need for this industry
against the needs of the environment, but the U.S. lags behind.13
The laws governing federal regulation of offshore marine aquaculture
have remained murky for decades.14 The patchwork legislation and
regulatory gaps have created a massive roadblock preventing federal
agencies from utilizing federal waters for seafood production.15 The lack
of comprehensive federal regulatory measures, along with the potential
environmental and economic impacts of marine aquaculture, slows the
development of commercial marine aquaculture.16 Today, courts are
entering into unchartered territory as administrative agencies seek to chip
away at the seafood trade deficit17 through the regulation of marine
aquaculture. Courts are left to determine the legality of agency attempts to

10. See Knapp & Rubino, supra note 1.
11. See id.
12. Elan Lowenstein, Regulating the Blue Revolution: A Sea of Change for
the United States’ Offshore Aquaculture Industry or a Missed Opportunity for
Increased Sustainability, 26 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 473, 476–77
(2019).
13. See Aquaculture, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://
www.fao.org/aquaculture/en/ [https://perma.cc/FA4A-CH7T] (last visited Sept.
3, 2021) (“FAO recognizes the fast-growing contribution aquaculture is making
to food security, providing technical assistance through the implementation of the
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.”).
14. Understanding Marine Aquaculture, supra note 3.
15. See id.
16. HAROLD F. UPTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43565, REAUTHORIZATION
ISSUES FOR THE MAGNUSON STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACt 24 (2014) [https://perma.cc/RXP5-S9NE].
17. Understanding Marine Aquaculture, supra note 3 (“Farmed seafood
products already make up half of the world’s seafood supply, but U.S. production
lags behind much of the world, leading to a $16.9 billion seafood deficit in the
United States in 2020.”).
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strategically maneuver around imperfect legislation to gain the benefits of
marine aquaculture in federal waters.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed this
issue in Gulf Fishermens Ass’n v. National Marine Fisheries Service,18 the
first instance in which a federal agency attempted to create an aquaculture
regime in federal waters pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (“Magnuson-Stevens Act” or
“MSA”), a federal statutory scheme for regulation of wild fisheries
enacted in 1976.19 In basing its decision solely on methods of statutory
interpretation and ending its analysis before fully determining what
deference should be afforded to an administrative agency’s interpretation
of the MSA, the court invalidated a thorough scheme to begin marine
aquaculture in the U.S. after ten years of planning.20
The issue is not that the Fifth Circuit blatantly erred in interpreting the
Magnuson-Stevens Act to preclude the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS), a federal agency within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), from regulating aquaculture in the Gulf. Rather,
the problem is that the majority prematurely cut off the statutory analysis.
Gulf Fishermens was the federal appellate judiciary’s first attempt at
interpreting the regulation of aquaculture in U.S. waters and essentially
served as a test case for any future attempts to regulate aquaculture in U.S.
waters. It was an opportunity for the Fifth Circuit to analyze all of the
concerns related to the aquaculture industry, including the statutory
framework, economic harm, environmental harm, and other implications
that inevitably accompany a vital and longstanding industry in the U.S.
Further, the court failed to address the reasonableness of a federal agency’s
attempt to maneuver through a poorly enacted area of law to achieve the
main goals of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The result places the country in
the same confusing position as it was in 1976 when the Magnuson-Stevens
Act was first enacted. As foreign countries capitalize on a highly technical
and lucrative industry, the U.S., or at the very least the territory within the
Fifth Circuit’s jurisdictional reach, is stuck relying on outdated traditional
methods of fishing and inland and coastal aquaculture regimes. While an
executive order, other administrative agencies, and pending legislation are
simply working around the Fifth Circuit decision, the states within the
jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit are all lost at sea.

18. Gulf Fishermens Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 968 F.3d 454 (5th
Cir. 2020).
19. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891(d).
20. See Gulf Fishermens, 968 F.3d 454.
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Part I of this Note will discuss the backdrop to federal regulation of
marine aquaculture in general and the factual details of Gulf Fishermens
Association v. National Marine Fisheries Service. Part II will analyze the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Gulf Fishermens including the methods of
statutory interpretation, issues raised within the parties’ briefs, and the the
arguments made in the dissent. Underlying issues within the opinion will
be identified and alternative outcomes will be discussed in depth. Part III
will explore the future, if any, of aquaculture in the Gulf after the Fifth
Circuit’s decision. Additionally, the effects of the decision will be
considered in light of recent activity by the executive branch, proposals to
Congress, and other relevant activity by the NMFS post-Gulf Fishermens.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Aquaculture in General
Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Act21 in 1976 as a response
to aggressive overfishing along the U.S. coast by large commercial fishing
trawler boats.22 The two primary purposes of the MSA are to conserve and
manage fisheries and fishery resources in U.S. waters as well as to
implement a framework to regulate fisheries and encourage sustainable
fishing practices.23
Congress delegated the administration of the MSA to the Secretary of
Commerce (the “Secretary”), and the Secretary conferred this authority of
administration to the NMFS, a division of the NOAA. 24 The MSA
established Regional Fishery Management Councils nationwide.25 These
councils are tasked with developing Fishery Management Plans (“FMPs”)
consistent with the national standards of promoting sustainable fisheries
management.26 The primary task of the councils is “to prepare fishery
management plans for its area, which must ‘assess and specify the present
and probable future condition of, and the maximum sustainable yield’ of

21. Id.
22. Robert J. McManus, America’s Saltwater Fisheries: So Few Fish, So
Many Fishermen, 9 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 13, 13 (1995).
23. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b).
24. Id. §§ 1854–1855; see Campanale & Sons, Inc. v. Evans, 311 F.3d 109,
111 (1st Cir. 2002).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a).
26. Partners: Regional Fishery Management Councils, NOAA FISHERIES,
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic/partners [https://perma.cc/Z9RZ-839G] (last
visited Sept. 3, 2020).
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a fishery.”27 The most relevant council for the purposes of this Note is the
Gulf Council, which has jurisdiction over federal waters “extend[ing] from
three to 200 miles off the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama,
and nine to 200 miles off Texas and the west coast of Florida.”28 The
NMFS has the responsibility of authorizing and implementing the FMPs
submitted by the Regional Fishery Management Councils, which are
ultimately adopted or rejected by the Secretary and subsequently put into
effect by regulation if adopted.29
The MSA defines “fishery” as stock or stocks of fish that can be
treated as an identifiable unit and also as the fishing for stocks.30 It defines
“fishing” as the actual, attempted, or actions reasonably expected to result
in the “catching, taking, or harvesting of fish.”31 The definition of fishing
also includes “any operations at sea in support of, or in preparation for,
any activity described in [16 U.S.C. § 1802(16)].”32 Neither the definition
of fishery nor fishing under the MSA expressly includes aquaculture or
fish farming.33 In fact, the language of the original MSA did not clearly
specify whether it was drafted with an intent to protect and control fish
farming at all.34 Instead, its language reflects Congress’s initial desire to
maintain control over U.S. waters and the fishery resources within its
territory.35 However, the entire MSA contains broad, inclusive language
that suggests it may reasonably encompass regulation of aquaculture
within its scope. Subsequent revisions to the MSA added references to
aquaculture or fish farming, but those references have not clarified
whether Congress intended for aquaculture to be governed under the
MSA.36
In 2009, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council proposed
an FMP to the NMFS entitled “Plan for Regulating Marine Aquaculture in
27. Kramer v. Mosbacher, 878 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1852–1853).
28. About Us, GULF MEX. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, https://gulfcouncil
.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/FD53-PLT9] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021); see also 16
U.S.C. § 1852.
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1854–1855; see also Campanale & Sons, 311 F.3d at 111.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(13).
31. Id. § 1802(16).
32. Id.
33. See id. § 1802(13), (16).
34. See id. §§ 1801–1891(d); see also Colby Stewart, A Current Affair:
Ensuring Sustainable Aquaculture in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, 20 VT.
J. ENVTL. L. 70, 84 (2019) (“Congress drafted and passed the MSA specifically
with harvesting fish from wild fisheries in mind.”).
35. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891(d).
36. See id.
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the Gulf of Mexico” (“the Plan”).37 The Plan was the first of its kind—a
novel attempt by the NMFS, or any council for that matter, to regulate
offshore aquaculture in the U.S.38 It proposed a more efficient, less
burdensome permitting process for the issuance of offshore aquaculture
permits.39 The Plan estimated that between five and twenty offshore fish
farms would take root in the Gulf within the next decade, and this
aquaculture scheme would produce approximately 64 million pounds of
seafood each year.40 In 2014, the NMFS published the proposed rule (“the
Rule”) to implement the Plan.41 The NOAA finalized the Rule two years
later.42 A coalition of fishing and conservation organizations, concerned
over the NMFS’s statutory authority as well as environmental and
economic consequences of the regulatory scheme for offshore aquaculture
set forth in the Rule, brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana in 2018.43
B. Gulf Fishermens Association v. National Marine Fisheries Service
Overview
In Gulf Fishermens, the Eastern District of Louisiana addressed the
question of whether the NMFS exceeded its statutory authority in
implementing the Rule to regulate aquaculture in the Gulf of Mexico.44
Whether the NMFS, an administrative agency, correctly interpreted the
MSA required the court to address the issue under a seminal administrative

37. Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic;
Aquaculture, 74 Fed. Reg. 26,829 (proposed June 4, 2009) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 622).
38. NOAA FISHERIES, MARINE AQUACULTURE IN THE U.S. 2 (2019),
https://media.fisheries.noaa.gov/2021-01/fact-sheet-marine-aquaculture-in-theus.pdf?VersionId=null.
39. Id.
40. Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, South Atlantic; Aquaculture,
79 Fed. Reg. 51,424, 51,427 (proposed Aug. 28, 2014) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
pts 600, 622) (“This maximum level of harvest represents the average landings of
all marine species in the Gulf, except menhaden and shrimp, between 2000–
2006.”).
41. Id.
42. Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic;
Aquaculture, 81 Fed. Reg. 1762, 1764 (Jan. 13, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
pts. 600, 622).
43. Gulf Fishermens Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 341 F. Supp. 3d
632, 637 (E.D. La. 2018).
44. Id.
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law standard: Chevron deference.45 The court focused on the plain text,
congressional intent, statutory scheme, and legislative history of the MSA
to determine whether the NMFS had the authority to regulate offshore
aquaculture.46 The court heavily emphasized the MSA’s plain language
such as “harvesting”47 and “found”48 as clear indicators that Congress was
referencing “traditional fishing activities” in the MSA rather than fish
farming.49 The references to aquaculture within the MSA are few and far
between, and the court asserted that regulation of aquaculture within the
MSA would render the statute nonsensical.50 The plain language and
statutory scheme, combined with an ambiguous legislative intent
regarding whether the MSA meant to include aquaculture, led the Eastern
District to end its analysis after only the first step of Chevron.51 That is,
under the Chevron analysis,52 the court abruptly ended the two-part
determination as to the extent of judicial deference afforded to an agency
interpretation before addressing step two of the analysis.53
Ultimately, the district court held that the MSA did not give the NMFS
authority to implement an aquaculture regulatory scheme in federal
waters.54 The court did not address the environmental and socioeconomic
arguments presented by the plaintiffs because “the NMFS was without
authority under the MSA to promulgate the Regulations, [so] it need not
address Plaintiffs’ other arguments.”55 The NMFS appealed the district
court’s grant of the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.56
In January 2019, the Fifth Circuit heard oral arguments on the same
issue: whether the NMFS, as an administrative agency, had the authority
to implement an aquaculture regulatory scheme under the MSA.57 Before
the Fifth Circuit released its decision, President Donald Trump signed an
executive order entitled “Executive Order on Promoting American
45. Id.; see also discussion infra Part III (“[Chevron], the landmark
administrative law case, established the test to determine whether a court must
defer to agency action.”).
46. Gulf Fishermens, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 637–41.
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(16).
48. Id. § 1801(b)(1).
49. Gulf Fishermens, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 638–39.
50. See id. at 639.
51. Id. at 641–42.
52. See discussion infra Part III.
53. See Gulf Fishermens, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 641–42.
54. Id. at 642.
55. Id. at 637.
56. Gulf Fishermens Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 968 F.3d 454,
459 (5th Cir. 2020).
57. Id. at 454.
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Seafood Competitiveness and Economic Growth,” which essentially
restated the goals and regulatory scheme set forth in the Gulf Council FMP
into an executive order so as to circumvent an anti-aquaculture decision
by the Fifth Circuit.58
Months after the Executive Order was signed, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the ruling by the Eastern District.59 The Fifth Circuit made it clear
that it would not create an entire aquaculture industry by reading
something into the MSA that did not expressly exist in its text with the
following powerful statement: “We will not bite.”60 The Fifth Circuit
approached its analysis by starting with Chevron Step One.61 The court
held that the plain text of the MSA did not indicate congressional
authorization to create and regulate marine aquaculture, referring to it as a
“textual dead zone” as far as aquaculture was concerned.62 The court then
determined whether the text of the MSA was at the very least ambiguous
and open-ended enough to permit the NMFS to regulate aquaculture
pursuant to the statute.63 The Fifth Circuit examined the definition of
“fishing”64 and concluded that although “harvesting of fish” is included in
the definition, it did not encompass aquaculture based on the other
language within the definition, other provisions of the MSA, and overall
lack of references to aquaculture and/or fish farming within the MSA.65
The court supported this interpretation by explaining the flaws in including
aquaculture within the scope of the MSA’s language, such as rendering
certain provisions “nonsensical” or not generally applicable.66 The Fifth
Circuit ended its analysis of the MSA at this point without moving on to
Chevron Step Two.67
The opinion in Gulf Fishermens was a two-thirds majority.68 Judge
Higginson dissented, arguing the NMFS was permitted to regulate marine
aquaculture in the Gulf under the MSA.69 The dissent focused on the broad
and inclusive language of the MSA’s definition of “fishing” as well as the
overall aims of the statute and the responsibilities assigned to the NMFS
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Exec. Order No. 13,921, 85 Fed. Reg. 28,471 (May 12, 2020).
Gulf Fishermens, 968 F.3d at 459.
Id. at 460.
Id.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id. at 462–66.
Id.
Id. at 468.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 469.
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such as the regulation of lobster traps, mussel lines, towed mesh cages,
and other non-traditional methods of fishing.70 Judge Higginson criticized
the majority’s decision to stop the analysis at Chevron Step One, arguing
that “even if the Magnuson Act’s capacious regulatory grant does not
unequivocally comprehend aquaculture, I would say it is at least
ambiguous.”71 While the MSA does not unambiguously allow for
aquaculture regulation, the majority focused too heavily on the more
restrictive words in the statute while simultaneously ignoring the
expansive language.72 The dissent further reasoned that the provisions
rendered ineffective or incompatible when including aquaculture in the
definition of “fishing” did not necessarily resolve the ambiguity issue.73
After moving to Chevron Step Two, Judge Higginson concluded that the
NMFS interpreted the MSA reasonably when fitting aquaculture in the
meaning of “fishing” and when considering the broad language
incorporated throughout the MSA.74 In fact, Judge Higginson asserted,
“[M]odern aquaculture methods of fishing fit vitally in, not out of, the
Magnuson Act regime.”75 However, if that is not sufficiently clear to
confer authority to the NMFS, the ambiguity of the MSA “oblig[es] [the
court] to defer to the NMFS’s reasonable interpretation before invalidating
over a decade of state and federal officials’ efforts. . . to draft [the Plan]
that reconciles myriad commercial, environmental, and recreational
interests.”76
II. ANALYSIS
A. Chevron Step Zero
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., a
landmark administrative law case, established the test to determine
whether and to what extent a court must defer to agency action.77 The
Chevron analysis is a two-step formula used to determine the
appropriateness of judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutory

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
(1984).

Id. at 469–70.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 470–71.
Id. at 471.
Id.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
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ambiguities or legislative silence.78 The Fifth Circuit in Gulf Fishermens
immediately started its review with a Chevron analysis. In doing so, the
court may have improperly skipped Chevron Step Zero.
In Gulf Fishermens, the Fifth Circuit began the Chevron analysis
immediately without any reference to United States v. Mead Corporation,
commonly referred to as “Chevron Step Zero.”79 Step Zero is the
preliminary step used to determine whether the court should apply
Chevron deference to an agency interpretation at all.80 The Supreme Court
in Mead clarified Chevron by explaining that Chevron deference, the
highest level of judicial deference, is only applicable when Congress
intended for an agency to speak with the force of law.81 If Congress
intended for the agency to have such authority, it falls within the “safe
harbor” and is entitled to Chevron deference.82 Otherwise, the
interpretation fails Step Zero and should instead receive a different, lower
level of agency deference, such as Skidmore deference,83 instead.84
Courts commonly ignore Step Zero when interpreting FMPs85 and
instead generally assume the FMPs are entitled to Chevron deference.86
78. See id. at 842–43.
79. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (“The weight of [an
agency interpretation] in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
84. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. (1984).
85. See, e.g., Oregon Trolles Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 452 F.3d 1104, 1119 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“Our obligation to give Chevron deference to the NMFS’s [National
Marine Fishery Service] interpretation of the Act that it is charged to administer
[resolves the question in this case] . . . .”). Many courts cite Chevron when
discussing the standard for judicial review in a challenge to an FMP or other
regulation under the MSA. See State of New York v. Locke, No. 08-CV-2503,
2009 WL 1194085, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2009) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842–43 (1984)); Fisherman’s Finest, Inc. v. Gutierrez, No. C07-1574MJP, 2008
WL 4889958, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2008) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842–43).
86. Kate Stanford, The Need for Chevron Step Zero in Judicial Review of
Interpretations Developed by Fishery Management Councils, 19 N.Y.U. ENV’T
L.J. 380, 402 (2012) (“[C]ourts neglect to perform anything resembling a
Mead/Step Zero analysis, most likely assuming that these plans fall into the Mead
safe harbor, which assumes that interpretations promulgated through notice-andcomment rulemaking carry the ‘force of law.’”).
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However, unlike the cases where courts have afforded Chevron deference
to FMPs, FMPs developed by a regional council, like the Plan at issue, are
not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act.87 Under the MSA,
regional councils make fishery management decisions and perform much
of the statute’s regulatory action.88 The NMFS made clear that it only
made editorial, non-substantive changes to the FMP submitted by the Gulf
Coast Regional Council.89
Since the interpretation at issue started from a council-developed
FMP, a Chevron analysis may be inappropriate because the Secretary of
Commerce, as the statutory designee acting through the NMFS, did not
make the interpretation at issue in Gulf Fishermens.90 The court would not
defer to a decision by the Secretary or NMFS but rather to the
interpretation of the Gulf Council.91 In fact, after the FMP was submitted
for public comment pursuant to the MSA,92 the Secretary took no
affirmative action, neither approving nor disapproving the Plan.93 Thus,
the FMP took effect by operation of law rather than by the statutory
design.94 The Gulf Council is characterized by decreased political
accountability, high levels of technical expertise, potential biases, and
other characteristics not found with official statutory designees.95 Thus,
the court may have been able to skip a Chevron analysis altogether in Gulf
Fishermens.

87. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(i)(1).
88. Charles T. Jordan, How Chevron Deference is Inappropriate in U.S.
Fishery Management and Conservation, 9 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 177, 181 (2019).
89. See Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic;
Aquaculture, 81 Fed. Reg. 1762, 1769 (Jan. 13, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
pts. 600, 622).
90. Stanford, supra note 86.
91. Jordan, supra note 88.
92. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(1).
93. See Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic;
Aquaculture, 81 Fed. Reg. at 1762.
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(3).
95. Stanford, supra note 86, at 411. (“Councils have several characteristics—
decreased political accountability, susceptibility to capture, and regionalization—
that cast doubt on the effectiveness of Council-developed policies and suggest that
Council-developed interpretations should not survive Chevron Step Zero.”); see
also Jordan, supra note 88, at 219 (“The procedures for creating and amending
the FMPs and regulations under the MSFCMA do not conform to those of
traditional agency actions.”).
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According to Mead, the court may have been justified in applying
Skidmore deference to the interpretations in the council-developed FMP.96
If the Gulf Fishermens court had taken the Mead approach rather than the
Chevron approach, it is uncertain whether it would have reached a
different conclusion since Chevron offers a higher level of deference to
administrative agencies. While Skidmore deference is not binding, it
requires the court to consider the persuasive weight of an agency’s
interpretation, including consistency with overall congressional purpose,
agency expertise, and other persuading factors.97 However, consideration
of this issue pursuant to Skidmore may have led to the permittance of an
aquaculture regime or may have given the Fifth Circuit more support from
refusing to permit the NMFS from regulating marine aquaculture in the
Gulf. While the intricacies of the type of deference courts should apply are
not the focus of this Note, recognizing the applicability of Chevron to
FMPs as questionable is important and should be acknowledged before
courts jump into Chevron in future litigation.
B. Chevron Step One
1. Silence
The Fifth Circuit opinion began with the two-step Chevron framework
to determine whether the NMFS interpretation of the MSA was sufficient
for judicial deference.98 The first prong of Chevron necessitates an inquiry
into “whether Congress has directly spoken on the precise question at
issue” by “exhausting all traditional tools of construction including text,
structure, history, and purpose.”99 If Congress has spoken to the issue in

96. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight [accorded to an administrative]
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evidenced in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.”)).
97. Baylor Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Price, 850 F.3d 257, 261 (5th Cir. 2017) (“The
degree of deference depends on ‘the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s]
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.’”).
98. See Gulf Fishermens Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 968 F.3d 454,
460 (5th Cir. 2020).
99. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984); Gulf Fishermens, 968 F.3d at 460.
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question, the Chevron analysis ends at Step One.100 If Congress has not
spoken, the court must then examine the second prong of Chevron to
determine whether the administrative agency interpreted the statutory
ambiguity or silence reasonably.101 If the agency’s interpretation is
deemed reasonable, the court must defer to it.102
As is typical in most statutory interpretations, the court explained it
would begin its analysis with the text of the MSA to determine if Congress
was silent as to whether the MSA includes regulation of marine
aquaculture.103 The Fifth Circuit referred to the MSA as a “textual dead
zone” regarding aquaculture or the creation of an entire aquaculture
regime.104 The three instances where aquaculture and/or fish farming are
referenced in the MSA were considered insignificant and disregarded by
the court in their plain text analysis.105
In support, the court relied on two cases: Texas v. United States106 and
Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency.107 However, these cases
are distinguishable from Gulf Fishermens because both involve extremely
clear, restrictive statutes that give no room to interpret silence into their
text. In Texas v. United States, the Fifth Circuit held that the Immigration
and Nationality Act was too intricate and specific to provide any leeway
to defer to agency interpretation because the level of specificity in the
statute filled any potential gap the agency sought to provide.108 Further,
the Fifth Circuit stated that Chevron Step One was not determinative
because the agency action would have failed Step Two as “manifestly
contrary” to the statute—an issue the Fifth Circuit never addressed in Gulf
Fishermens.109
Similarly, in Ethyl the D.C. Circuit held that a statute permitting the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to waive a probation for fuel
additives upon a factual finding that the additive was not problematic did
not permit the EPA to waive the prohibition for other reasons, specifically
public health, because public health was not mentioned in the statute.110

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
See id. at 843.
See id.
Gulf Fishermens, 968 F.3d at 460.
Id.
See id. at 460 n.11.
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Texas, 809 F.3d at 186.
See id.
Ethyl, 51 F.3d at 1055.
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The statute at issue in Gulf Fishermens is much broader than those at
issue in Texas and Ethyl. The MSA provides leeway to permit aquaculture
regulation without expanding the scope of the statute by an alternative
interpretation of “fishing.”111
The Fifth Circuit’s plain text analysis focused less on the text of the
MSA and more on the text of the Appellants’ Opening Brief taken out of
context.112 The Fifth Circuit repeatedly pointed out that the NMFS applied
the first step of Chevron backwards by claiming the MSA grants the
NMFS authority to regulate aquaculture because it “fail[ed] to express[]
Congress’s unambiguous intent to foreclose the regulation of
aquaculture.”113 However, the NMFS did not assert authority to regulate
based upon a lack of express preclusion of regulation of aquaculture.
Instead, the NMFS made this point to reject the Eastern District’s
conclusion that the plaintiffs prevailed under Chevron Step One.114 The
NMFS was not arguing that “nothing-equals-something,” as the Fifth
Circuit claimed.115 If anything, the NMFS made a nothing-equals-nothing
argument in that the MSA’s failure to expressly mention aquaculture was
insufficient evidence that Congress intended to preclude the NMFS from
regulating aquaculture altogether. In short, the MSA neither expressly
conferred nor foreclosed authority to regulate aquaculture on the NMFS.
The court concluded the simple, plain text analysis with a classic
metaphor claiming the NMFS’s argument is “all elephant and no
mousehole.”116 The majority implied that the text of the MSA leaves
absolutely no room, or “mouseholes,” to read aquaculture into the MSA.117
The MSA provisions declare the purposes of the MSA to include, inter
alia, managing all fish in federal waters, promoting domestic commercial
fishing, and encouraging the development of the U.S. fishing industry.118
The MSA defines “fishing” to include “activity which can reasonably be

111. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(16).
112. Gulf Fishermens Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 968 F.3d 454,
460–62 (5th Cir. 2020).
113. Id. at 461.
114. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 26, Gulf Fishermens Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Service, 968 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-30006); see Petit v. U.S.
Dep't of Education, 675 F.3d 769, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (stating that in order to
“prevail under Chevron Step One” a plaintiff “must show that the statute
unambiguously forecloses the [agency's] interpretation” (quoting Village of
Barrington, Ill. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
115. Gulf Fishermens, 968 F.3d at 460.
116. Id. at 462.
117. Id.
118. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b).
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expected to result in the catching, taking, or harvesting of fish” and “any
operation in support” thereof.119 These exemplary provisions suggest there
are indeed mouseholes within the MSA that the Fifth Circuit deliberately
chose to overlook.
2. Ambiguity
After determining that the NMFS failed to prove the MSA was silent
on the issue, the Fifth Circuit proceeded to reject the Agency’s argument
that the MSA is, at a minimum, ambiguous as to the regulation of
aquaculture.120 The primary argument the Fifth Circuit raised was that the
word “harvesting” within the MSA definition of “fishing”121 cannot be
interpreted to include aquaculture.122 The NMFS argued that the dictionary
definition for “harvesting”123 suggests that the MSA intended to include
aquaculture within the definition of “fishing.”124 However, the court stated
it was “far better to read ‘harvesting’ as synonymous with the adjacent
terms ‘catching’ and ‘taking.’”125
By claiming the three words catching, taking, and fishing are similar
in meaning simply because they are strung together under a noscitur a
sociis method of interpretation, the court ignores and contradicts the
surrounding language of the MSA.126 The court’s noscitur a sociis127
approach to statutory interpretation severely restricted the scope of the
MSA. The definition of fishing not only includes actual or attempted
catching, taking, or harvesting of fish, but it also includes “any other
activity which can be reasonably expected to result in the catching, taking,
or harvesting of fish; or any operation at sea in support [thereof].”128 The
expansive language within the definition suggests Congress intended
“fishing” to encompass a broad range of activities, not limited in the
119. Id. § 1802(16).
120. Gulf Fishermens, 968 F.3d at 462.
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(16).
122. Gulf Fishermens, 968 F.3d at 462–66.
123. Id. at 462 (using the dictionary definition of “harvest” as “[t]o reap and
gather in” a “ripe crop”).
124. Id. at 463.
125. Id. at 462–63.
126. See id. at 454.
127. United States v. Buluc, 930 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Noscitur a
sociis (‘it is known by its associates’) applies ‘when a string of statutory terms
raises the implication that the words grouped in a list should be given related
meaning.’”) (quoting United States v. Lauderdale Cnty, Miss., 914 F.3d 960, 967
(5th Cir. 2019)).
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(16).
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manner the court suggests. At the very least, the word “harvesting” within
the MSA offers two legitimate interpretations: one including aquaculture
and the other precluding it.
The court supported this argument by suggesting that Congress
considered aquaculture when implementing the MSA in 1976 and
deliberately decided to leave it out of the statute.129 Nothing in the
legislative history suggests this. To the contrary, subsequent amendments
to the MSA include references to aquaculture.130 If Congress intended the
statute to preclude aquaculture in its entirety, including any specific
references to aquaculture within the MSA’s amendments would not make
sense unless a reference was included to expressly prevent aquaculture
regulation under the MSA. It is not “unfathomable,” as the court
suggested,131 to consider Congress may have intended “harvesting” to be
interpreted by its common sense, broader meaning to include aquaculture
rather than limit it through a noscitur a sociis interpretation.
The Fifth Circuit moved to the broader statutory scheme of the MSA,
claiming that if aquaculture was included within “fishing,” other MSA
provisions would be rendered “nonsensical.”132 The main argument in
support of this nonsensical theory was that an aquaculture system was
incapable of being overfished, and thus the authorization to the NMFS to
regulate aquaculture in the Gulf contradicted the main purpose of the
MSA: the prevention of overfishing.133 The majority rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that aquaculture would help to mitigate overfishing in
the Gulf and instead restricted the language of the MSA to require FMPs
to prevent overfishing within the actual fishery itself, the fish farms, rather
than to the Gulf as a whole.134
The court was again cherry-picking certain provisions and language
within the MSA while simultaneously ignoring others. The primary
purpose of the MSA is not to exclusively prevent overfishing within
fisheries but rather to conserve and manage all fish in federal waters.135
Other purposes of the MSA include promoting commercial fishing and
encouraging the development of the U.S. fishing industries.136 Specifically
related to FMPs, the plans must “prevent overfishing” while
simultaneously considering efficiency, minimizing costs, and “rebuilding
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See Gulf Fishermens, 968 F.3d at 465–66.
See id. at 466 n.26.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 467.
16 U.S.C. § 1802(b).
See discussion supra Part I.
16 U.S.C. § 1802(b).
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overfished stocks.”137 The court ignored these purposes and relied too
heavily on the more restrictive provisions of the MSA.
The court concluded the incompatibility that occurs when aquaculture
is included within the definition of fishing is a “clear indication that
Congress did not intend for the MSA to grant the NMFS authority to
regulate aquaculture.”138 However, no such indication exists here, as the
regulation of aquaculture under the MSA has been unclear since the
statute’s enactment in 1976. Thus, the court simply chose to read clarity
into an ambiguous statute.
C. Chevron Step Two
At a minimum, the Fifth Circuit should have moved to Chevron Step
Two to determine whether the NMFS or the Gulf Council interpreted the
MSA reasonably because the Act was ambiguous. In Step Two, the
question is “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”139 The Fifth Circuit would not impose its own
interpretation of the MSA but rather would defer to the NMFS’s
interpretation “if it [was] a reasonable interpretation of the statute—not
necessarily the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation
deemed most reasonable by the courts.”140 Presumably, the court chose not
to move on to Chevron Step Two because the NMFS had acted reasonably.
The MSA was enacted for various purposes, many of which the Fifth
Circuit failed to acknowledge. For example, the MSA explicitly states that
FMPs “will achieve and maintain, on a continuing basis, the optimum
yield” from fisheries.141 It also states that the Regional Councils will
“exercise sound judgment . . . [and] take into account the social and
economic needs of the States.”142 The language is not restrictive but rather
forward-looking and indicative of Congress’s intent for the MSA to evolve
with the needs of fisheries as well as the needs of the nation. The policies
set forth in the MSA have similar language such as “to assure that the
national fishery conservation and management program utilizes . . . the
best scientific information available; involves, and is responsive to the
needs of, interested and affected States and citizens; considers efficiency.
137. Id. § 1851(a).
138. Gulf Fishermens, 968 F.3d at 468.
139. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
140. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. U.S. Env’t. Prot. Agency, 920 F.3d 999, 1028 (5th
Cir. 2019).
141. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(4).
142. Id. § 1801(b)(5).
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. . and is workable and effective.”143 The need for aquaculture has evolved
in the past few decades as technology has advanced and access to fishable
seafood has declined. Perhaps Congress deliberately designed the MSA to
adapt with society, as the language of the MSA suggests, and marine
aquaculture would be an effective tool to fulfill the MSA’s goals despite
its absence from the text of the MSA. If Congress knew in 1976 the present
state of our fishing industries and the current need for a marine aquaculture
regulatory regime, Congress would encourage the NMFS’s action in the
Rule. As Judge Higginson stated, “modern aquaculture methods of fishing
fit vitally in, not out of, the Magnuson Act regime.”144
As already noted, the Gulf Council consists of members with high
levels of experience and expertise in fishing and aquaculture, as is true for
all the Regional Councils. The Gulf Council’s FMP was first proposed in
2009 and had undergone numerous reviews and changes prior to this
litigation. The NMFS worked for years to find a pathway to regulate
aquaculture under a flawed statute, and the NMFS took into consideration
environmental, economic, and any other reasonable concerns that related
to aquaculture. The Rule was required to comply with the MSA in full,
and while some provisions fit awkwardly, such as the overfishing or
optimum yield requirements, the Rule addressed each instance of
incongruence with the MSA and offered compatible alternatives.145 The
Rule did not contravene the requirements of the MSA. In fact, it addressed
and resolved each misfitting provision to align with the overall goals of
the MSA. Each of these facts suggest that the Gulf Council FMP and the
NMFS reasonably interpreted the MSA despite seeming to fit a “square
peg in a round hole.” Again, the agency’s interpretation need not be
perfect; it simply needs to be permissible.
The Fifth Circuit repeatedly relied on the single most significant
purpose of the MSA—to conserve and manage wild fish.146 To achieve
this goal, the MSA needs to control regulation of marine aquaculture to
143. Id. § 1801(c)(3).
144. Gulf Fishermens Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 968 F.3d 454,
471 (5th Cir. 2020) (Higginson, S. dissenting).
145. See Read Porter & Rebecca Kihslinger, Federal Environmental
Permitting of Offshore Aquaculture: Coverage and Challenges, 45 ENV’T L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10875, 10881 (2015) (“FMPs must contain mandatory
provisions, including overfishing thresholds, annual catch targets, optimum yield
assessments, and EFH conservation measures . . . Although the concepts of yield
and catch are relevant to aquaculture, determination of these provisions . . . cannot
be directly applied to aquaculture. As a result, FMPs for aquaculture must
incorporate alternative means of satisfying these requirements.”).
146. See discussion supra Part I.
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some extent because it “is an important link in protecting the environment
from the impacts of offshore aquaculture.”147 The NMFS is authorized to
deploy management measures and permits that adhere to the provisions
within the MSA, and allowing the NMFS to regulate aquaculture with
strict adherence to the MSA, such as in the Rule, would result in marine
aquaculture development while minimizing negative impacts to the
environment, wild fish, and the fishing economy.148 The best route for the
NMFS to regulate marine aquaculture is pursuant to the MSA because the
MSA functions to protect wild fish, whereas alternative mechanisms, such
as those seen in the aftermath of Gulf Fishermens Association, may not.
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. Executive Attempts to Regulate Aquaculture
The Executive Branch has taken interest in aquaculture since the Gulf
Council initially released its Plan. In 2009, President George W. Bush
pushed the National Aquaculture Act of 2007 to encourage the Plan, but
the bill never became law.149 President Barack Obama also attempted to
improve the U.S. marine aquaculture regime, or lack thereof, with
initiatives to encourage domestic aquaculture and increase federal
aquaculture research.150 Most recently, the Trump Administration issued
an Executive Order—Promoting American Seafood Competitiveness and
Economic Growth—before the Fifth Circuit released its decision in Gulf
Fishermens.151
Unlike the MSA, the Executive Order specifically defines aquaculture
as the “harvesting of aquatic species,” implying the Order was specifically
drafted to address the concerns set forth in Gulf Fishermens.152 The Fifth
Circuit decision calls into question the legal authority relied upon by the
Executive Order, as the Order expressly states its consistency with the

147. Porter & Kihslinger, supra note 145, at 10882.
148. Id.
149. Steven Hedlund, U.S. Approves Open-Ocean Aquaculture in Gulf,
SEAFOODSOURCE (Sept. 3, 2009), https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/aquacult
ure/u-s-approves-open-ocean-aquaculture-in-gulf [https://perma.cc/2PML-PS8G].
150. April Forristall, Obama Aims to Protect Oceans, End Illegal Fishing,
SEAFOODSOURCE (June 17, 2014), https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supplytrade/obama-aims-to-protect-oceans-end-illegal-fishing [https://perma.cc/4F53-9
BDQ].
151. Exec. Order No. 13,921, 85 Fed. Reg. 28,471 (May 12, 2020).
152. See id.
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MSA.153 The Executive Order explicitly acknowledges that any action
taken thereunder is subject to the provisions of the MSA.154 It also
designates NOAA as the lead agency for aquaculture regulation in federal
waters.155 The Executive Order also requires the Secretary of Commerce
to consult with other agencies, including the EPA and the Department of
Agriculture, as well as “appropriate Regional Fishery Management
Councils” and to subsequently identify “at least two geographic areas
containing locations suitable for commercial aquaculture.”156 These
“Aquaculture Opportunity Areas,” once assessed, are intended to be the
starting points for federal regulation of marine aquaculture.157
The question of whether, in the absence of a clear delegation of
congressional authority, the President may legally grant NOAA the power
to regulate offshore aquaculture is dependent upon if Congress delegated
its power to regulate marine aquaculture to the executive branch.158 If so,
the Executive Order may represent a valid exercise of authority. However,
the Gulf Fishermens decision implies that President Trump lacked
authority because the Executive Order must comply with the MSA.159
NOAA announced its intent to move forward with aquaculture regulation
and has already identified its two Aquaculture Opportunity Areas—the
coast of southern California and the southwest coast of Florida—pursuant
to the Executive Order.160 Florida is in the Eleventh Circuit, so NOAA’s
actions are an attempt to regulate aquaculture in the Gulf by avoiding the
Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction.161 Until a case similar to Gulf Fishermens is
brought and decided in the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit decision can
be disregarded as NOAA continues its plan to regulate marine aquaculture.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 28,472.
155. Id. at 28,473.
156. Id. at 28,474.
157. See id.
158. Charles Witek, Executive Order Could Impact Coastal Fisheries,
Habitats: Part II, MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK (June 11, 2020),
https://conservefish.org/2020/06/11/executive-order-could-impact-coastal-fisher
ies-habitats-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/7KEE-UFD2].
159. Exec. Order No. 13,921, 85 Fed. Reg. at 28,472.
160. NOAA Announces Regions for First Two Aquaculture Opportunity Areas
Under Executive Order on Seafood, NOAA FISHERIES (Aug. 20, 2020), https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/noaa-announces-regions-first-two-aquacul
ture-opportunity-areas-under-executive-order [https://perma.cc/Z7FT-ZQB6].
161. Cathy Carter, Despite Federal Ruling, Fish Farm Company Says Gulf
Project Moving Forward, WUSF PUB. MEDIA (Aug. 7, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://
wusfnews.wusf.usf.edu/environment/2020-08-07/despite-federal-ruling-fish-farmcompany-says-gulf-project-moving-forward [https://perma.cc/6LAS-RCYT].
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The Executive Order seeks to do exactly what the Gulf Council sought
with its FMP but on a federal level. However, its primary goals are
“remov[ing] unnecessary regulatory barriers” and “facilitat[ing]
aquaculture projects” rather than conservation and management of marine
ecosystems as in the MSA.162 Whether or not this Order renders the Fifth
Circuit decision meaningless is unclear, but it does minimize its impact.
By limiting its interpretation of the MSA to Chevron Step One, the Fifth
Circuit forfeited the opportunity to address legitimate concerns that may
have provided more clarity on the impact of President Trump’s Executive
Order moving forward.
Currently, the Executive Order and the decision in Gulf Fishermens
leave the industry in a fishy position. Advocates of offshore aquaculture
remain optimistic that the Biden Administration will not interfere with the
future of aquaculture because of the nation’s need for food security and
economic stability post-Covid-19.163 Opponents of marine aquaculture, in
contrast, request that President Joe Biden replace the previous Order with
a new Order supporting sustainable wild capture fishing communities and
cease U.S. marine aquaculture development entirely.164 The uncertainty
surrounding the Gulf Fishermens decision regarding the future of
aquaculture, or lack thereof, places everyone in an unsettling position.
B. Legislative Attempts to Regulate Aquaculture
Legislation regarding aquaculture has been proposed before Congress
numerous times over the years. In 2018, companion bills were introduced
in the House and Senate to provide NOAA the authority to regulate
aquaculture in federal waters under the name Advancing the Quality and
Understanding of American Aquaculture (“AQUAA Act”).165 The
AQUAA Act was designed to streamline the permitting process for putting
aquaculture farms in federal waters while also providing funds for
162. See Exec. Order No. 13,921, 85 Fed. Reg. at 28,471; see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 1801(b).
163. See Liza Mayer, U.S. Aquaculture Industry to Present Wish List to
President-elect Biden, AQUACULTURE N. AM. (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.aqua
culturenorthamerica.com/u-s-aquaculture-industry-to-present-wish-list-to-presid
ent-elect-biden/ [https://perma.cc/373T-6CXX].
164. Letter to President-Elect Biden on Industrial Fish Farming Executive
Order, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH (Dec. 15, 2020), https://1bps6437gg8c169i0y1
drtgz-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/2020-12-15-FINALBiden-seafood-EO-sign-on-from-52-orgs.pdf [https://perma.cc/978P-26C8].
165. AQUAA Act, H.R. 6966, 115th Cong. (2018); AQUAA Act, S. 3138,
115th Cong. (2018).
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aquaculture research.166 The AQUAA Act set forth national standards for
sustainable offshore aquaculture and designated NOAA as the lead federal
agency for marine aquaculture.167 The bill, introduced in 2018, died when
Congress’s term ended in early 2019.168
The bipartisan AQUAA Act was reintroduced in the House in March
2020,169 and the companion bill was introduced in the Senate in September
2020.170 The two bills do not seek to do anything the NMFS was not
already attempting to do in the Rule. Similar to the Executive Order, the
notable difference between the AQUAA Act and the MSA is the purpose,
and the former, first and foremost, prioritizes the promotion of the
American seafood industry.171 Whether Congress will act is unknown, but
the two bills sandwiched around the Executive Order and the Gulf
Fishermens decision may finally push Congress to take action on the issue
of marine aquaculture.
C. The Future of Marine Aquaculture
The Gulf Fishermens decision only directly affects the authority of the
NMFS to regulate aquaculture in the Gulf of Mexico. The NMFS website
and the Gulf Council website have expressly stated that the FMP has been
“voided” after the Fifth Circuit’s decision.172 However, that does not mean
that the NMFS has lost hope for regulation of marine aquaculture in
federal waters. The NMFS simply needs to move outside the Fifth
Circuit’s jurisdiction, which it already intends to do off the coasts of
Florida and California pursuant to the Executive Order.173
Since Gulf Fishermens was the NMFS Council’s first attempt to
regulate marine aquaculture with an FMP under the MSA, any future
attempts by the NMFS or other regional councils will face similar backlash
as the Gulf Council. Because the NMFS has already announced its intent

166. Sam Hill, Bill Pushing for US Offshore Aquaculture Development
Reintroduced in House, SEAFOODSOURCE (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.seafood
source.com/news/aquaculture/bill-pushing-for-us-offshore-aquaculture-development
-reintroduced-in-house [https://perma.cc/2TKX-S85U].
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. AQUAA Act, H.R. 6191, 116th Cong. (2020); Hill, supra note 166.
170. AQUAA Act, S. 4723, 116th Cong. (2020).
171. See Hill, supra note 166.
172. See Southeast, NOAA FISHERIES, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/region
/southeast [https://perma.cc/K686-73A5] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
173. See NOAA Announces Regions for First Two Aquaculture Opportunity
Areas Under Executive Order on Seafood, supra note 160.
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to pursue marine aquaculture, it is likely that litigation will ensue with
every attempt and burden the courts in the same manner as Gulf
Fishermens unless and until Congress decides to act.
Multiple other federal agencies have some authority to regulate
aquaculture, including the Army Corps of Engineers, EPA, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the Department of Agriculture.174 However, no
agency has as much authority as the NMFS in the regulation of marine
aquaculture. Other laws, such as the National Aquaculture Act of 1980 and
the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1980, might provide the NOAA
and NMFS authority to regulate marine aquaculture, but the MSA remains
the primary law governing fisheries.175 However, the NMFS remains the
sole authority for issuance of permits applicable for offshore
aquaculture—no other agency has primary permitting authority. The MSA
also provides the only regulatory scheme that addresses both
environmental protection and controlled regulation of sustainable fishing
practices.176
Presently, the Fifth Circuit and the Executive Order are in direct
conflict with each other. While the Fifth Circuit suggested the issue in Gulf
Fishermens is a matter best resolved by Congress, the aquaculture industry
is not waiting idly for congressional action. The Fifth Circuit’s decision
may finally be the push Congress needs to take action on aquaculture. If
Congress does not act, however, aquaculture will continue to move
forward outside of the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction under less stringent
conservation and management requirements as would have been
implemented under the Gulf Council’s Plan. The MSA prioritizes
conservation whereas both the Executive Order and the AQUAA Act
prioritize the commercial value of aquaculture. In the absence of
congressional action, the aquaculture industry may proceed in a manner
more harmful and less controlled than it would have had the Fifth Circuit
afforded Chevron deference to the NMFS interpretation of the MSA.
CONCLUSION
In Gulf Fishermens, the Fifth Circuit read clarity into an unclear
statute by determining that the MSA in no way permits the NMFS to
174. Gulf Fishermens Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 968 F.3d 454,
471 (5th Cir. 2020).
175. Tristan Baurick, Trump Administration Moves Forward with Gulf Fish
Farming Plan Despite Court Decision, NOLA.COM (Sept. 8, 2020, 5:45 PM),
https://www.nola.com/news/environment/article_a17ff10c-f202-11ea-a4cb-f352
b9ed1d 03.html [https://perma.cc/XC5T-QYEQ].
176. Gulf Fishermens, 968 F.3d at 471 n.43.
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regulate marine aquaculture in the Gulf. By cutting the analysis to merely
a Chevron Step One interpretation, the Fifth Circuit failed to address
questions that have existed in the fishing industry since the enactment of
the MSA in 1976. Environmental and economic concerns are the primary
arguments against marine aquaculture, and the best routes to combat those
concerns are either through congressional action or under the MSA, an act
intended to conserve and manage wild fish. However, the Fifth Circuit’s
decision did not pause the development of a marine aquaculture industry
in the U.S. after Gulf Fishermens. Instead, the NMFS plans to create an
aquaculture regime in the Gulf, and uncertainty exists as to whether these
new initiatives will afford the same levels of protection to federal waters
and wild fish populations as they would pursuant to the MSA. However,
based on the goals set forth in the Executive Order and the AQUAA Act,
it appears the initiatives will not.
Along with flawed methods of interpretation limiting the Fifth Circuit
to an erroneously brief Chevron analysis, the implications of this decision
will affect not only the fishing industry in the Gulf of Mexico but also
future attempts similar to the Gulf Council’s attempts with its FMP.
Moving forward, the Executive Order, the AQUAA Act, and the Fifth
Circuit decision place the future of the aquaculture industry in troubled
waters. Ideally, Gulf Fishermens is the final push Congress needs to make
a choice regarding marine aquaculture. If not, the consequences are
increased litigation, commercial and economic harm, and less controlled
development of marine aquaculture in federal waters.
The Fifth Circuit stated that including aquaculture within the meaning
of “harvesting” was impermissible because it would be “a slippery basis
for empowering an agency to create an entire industry the statute did not
even mention,”177 but the future of aquaculture alongside continued
congressional inaction will be even more slippery by placing the economic
incentives of fish farming ahead of environmental protections afforded by
the MSA. Marine aquaculture in the U.S. is inevitable, but the Fifth Circuit
blocked the safest route to developing the industry by refusing to bite on
the NMFS’s authority to regulate aquaculture under the MSA based on a
restrictive interpretation of one word—harvesting.

177. Id. at 456.

